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Abstract
Impulsivity is associated with several psychiatric disorders in which the loss of control of a specific behavior determines the
syndrome itself. One particularly interesting population characterized by reported high impulsivity and problematic
decision-making are those diagnosed with pathological gambling. However the association between impulsivity and
decision making in pathological gambling has been only partially confirmed until now. We tested 23 normal controls and 23
diagnosed pathological gamblers in an intertemporal choice task, as well as other personality trait measurements. Results
showed that gamblers scored higher on impulsivity questionnaires, and selected a higher percentage of impatient choices
(higher percentage of smaller, sooner rewards), when compared to normal controls. Moreover, gamblers were faster in
terms of reaction times at selecting the smaller, sooner options and discounted rewards more rapidly over time.
Importantly, regression analyses clarified that self-reported measures of impulsivity played a significant role in biasing
decisions towards small but more rapidly available rewards. In the present study we found evidence for impulsivity in
personality traits and decisions in pathological gamblers relative to controls. We conclude by speculating on the need to
incorporate impulsivity and decision biases in the conceptualization of pathological gambling for a better understanding
and treatment of this pathology.
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Introduction
Impulsivity is a prominent feature of several psychiatric
disorders in which the loss of control of a specific behavior
determines the syndrome itself, such as: substance dependence [1],
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) [2], and patho-
logical gambling [3]. Furthermore, higher impulsivity has also
been linked to higher rates of relapse in substance users,
individuals with bipolar disorder, and more importantly with the
present paper, pathological gamblers [4,5]. Notably, these
pathological deviations may reflect an exaggeration of basic
personality traits that are present in the non-pathological
population [6,7].
Although the term ‘‘impulsivity’’ is widely used, there is no
general agreement in terms of its broader definition. Some authors
suggested that the concept of impulsivity may be considered as an
umbrella term with different facets that may be linked to a clinical
condition (see also the concept of positive and negative urgency in
[8]. Beside general personality trait definitions, factor analyses of
neuropsychological measures (Go/No Go, Stroop task, Stop
Signal task) have revealed the existence of an ‘‘inhibitory control’’
system that when damaged leads to impulsive behavior [3]. The
lack of inhibition can be also seen as a lack of self-control [9], or
diminished self-regulation [4]. Importantly, individual differences
in lack of inhibition or self-control can explain individual
differences in impulsive behaviors for both normal and patholog-
ical populations [10].
One particularly interesting population characterized by
reported high impulsivity and problematic decision behavior is
the one diagnosed with pathological gambling. Pathological
gambling afflicts about 2% of the general population [11] and
was classified until now (DSM IV-TR, APA, 1994) as a disorder of
impulse control, though in the actual version (DSM V, APA, 2013)
it has been classified under the substance related and addictive
disorders. However, the vast majority of studies have found that
gamblers score higher than control participants on personality
inventories assessing impulsivity [12,13,14,15,16]. Previous studies
have found diminished neurocognitive self-regulatory functions in
PG [17], and neurological changes in reward systems [18,19].
Neurobiological studies indicate that diminished dopamine
receptor availability (due to addiction behaviors) may cause a
chronic reward deficiency in the brain, resulting in a vulnerability
towards reward dependent behaviors [20,21].
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One way to test for impulsivity in abnormal populations is to use
self-reported measures such as questionnaires that measure
thoughts and behaviors related to impatience and lack of control.
This kind of measurement can be viewed as an indicator of the
phenotype of the disorder [4]. Another way is represented by
performance measure of reward sensitivity/processing that detect
underlying problems in basic cognitive functions such as decision
making. This kind of measurement can be seen as an indicator of
the endophenotype of the disorder, or the functions that underlie a
disorder [4,22]. Of all kinds of decision that we are daily asked to
make, there is one of particular interest for the present paper
known as intertemporal decisions, strictly related to impulsivity
and impatience. Intertemporal choices refer to choices that are
available at different time points in which one has to evaluate the
trade-off between costs and benefits of waiting to have that option.
When making intertemporal decisions, humans tend to prefer the
soonest available option even if it is the smallest one. Behavioral
economists have proposed a discounted utility model (DUT) that
relies upon an normative framework to account for intertemporal
choices [23]. For example, according to Mazur [24] the value of a
reward decreases over time with a hyperbolic function: SV=R/
(1+ kT), where SV is the subjective value of the delayed reward R
after a waiting time T, and k is the delay discount rate. Though
this model has been constructed to capture more precisely people’s
decisions, it assumes that decision-makers choose between options
based on a weighted sum of utilities with the temporal discount
factor as a weight. Therefore according to this model, humans
should show a preference for the option that maximizes utility
across a reasonable waiting time. However, this is not always the
case. Indeed, humans can be very impatient when making a
monetary choice, thus violating the DUT (i.e. exhibiting a steeper
hyperbolic function than Mazur equation predicts). These time-
inconsistent preferences have been shown in the animal and
human literature for several decades. A common Latin saying is
‘‘tempus edax rerum’’ (Ovidio, Metamorfosi, XV, 234) that is,
‘‘time devours things’’. This intuition takes account of our
tendency to incorporate in valuation both the stimulus itself (the
reward) as well as how long it will take for us to receive it. Reward
is an important and ubiquitous aspect of decision-making.
Intertemporal decisions seem highly related to impulsivity [25],
and are often used as a measure of trait impulsivity [26]. Indeed,
temporal discounting is thought to rely on two separate processes,
a logical/rational and an emotional/visceral process [27]. The
degree to which one chooses the emotionally relevant response
(i.e., choosing an immediate reward) may be determined by the
lack of control over immediately available rewards, or in other
words by impulsivity. Animal studies across species
[28,29,30,31,32,33,34] have also shown a preference for the small
immediate reward, at least once the large reward delay exceeds
some threshold limit. Beside animals, also humans typically tend to
prefer choosing the immediately available reward. Indeed, when
choosing between an immediate and a delayed reward, both
humans and animals typically tend to prefer choosing the
immediately available reward, even if it is sometimes substantially
smaller than the delayed option [35,36].
Several factors can potentially affect this time related devalu-
ation. Some authors pointed out that the degree to which one
chooses the immediate reward may be determined by diminished
neurocognitive self-regulatory functions, or in other words by
impulsivity [37,4,38,27]. Diminished self-regulation means that an
addicted person is not able to inhibit the urge for a desired drug or
behavior [4]. If this is the case, we argue that people with severe
lack of impulse control (i.e. high impulsive traits) are much more
impatient in their choices, i.e. prefer the soonest available reward
even though this is the less monetarily valuable.
In the recent past there have been a few attempts to study
impulsive decision-making in populations suffering from addiction.
Impatient choices have been evaluated in substance abusers
(another syndrome characterized by lack of control over imme-
diate rewards, i.e. heroin), and authors found that these
populations discounted delayed monetary rewards more rapidly
than controls [39]. Similar results were found for cigarette smokers
[40], and for heavy drinkers [41].
More relevant to the present paper, a study from Holt, Green,
and Myerson [42] reported significantly steeper discount function
in student gamblers when compared with a matched control
group. However, this study did not involve real pathological
gamblers. A first attempt to study impulsive decisions in
pathological gamblers was conducted by Petry [43], who tested
subjects with gambling problems in intertemporal scenarios. Using
gamblers both with and without substance use disorder, they
found that gamblers with substance use disorder discounted more
rapidly rewards over time when compared with both controls and
pure gamblers (respectively: k = 0.30, k = 0.02, k = 0.07). However,
it is well known that substance use has neurotoxic effects on the
brain and indeed may have been the primary causes of the results,
rather than gambling behavior itself. Moreover, the pure gamblers
used in this study were not an actual clinical population, but were
rather recruited through advertisements for free and confidential
gambling treatment. The experiment consisted of a scenario of
printed cards with two options randomly selected per subject. This
scenario methodology has been criticized as in some cases people
may be less susceptible to emotional involvement than when they
perform an actual choice [44]). Further, results on actual choices,
reaction times, and eventual relationships between actual choices
and impulsivity were not presented, though a correlation with all k
values and Eysenck test was shown. Another study by Brevers and
colleagues [45], studied delay discounting in pathological gamblers
finding stronger discount rates in gamblers relative to controls.
However, the gamblers tested in this study showed other
differences in relevant pathological dimensions, rather than
gambling addiction only, such as anxiety (but also depression
and ADHD), though limiting the interpretation of the results.
Previous studies showed that anxiety may strong bias decision
making [46,47]. Moreover, even in this study, actual choices,
reaction times, and eventual relationships between actual choices
and impulsivity were not considered.
In another study, Alessi and Petry [48], replicated previous
results on steeper discounting, but this time evaluating the role of
impulsivity in intertemporal choices, and found that gambling
severity was the best predictor (soon followed by impulsivity
measures) of impulsive choices. Finally, a paper from Dixon and
colleagues [49], reported steeper discount rates for gamblers when
tested in gambling versus non gambling contexts. However, these
studies did not involve a control group, and the group of gamblers
reported comorbidity for other addictions (alcohol and drug).
The aim of this paper is to examine the inherent impulsivity of
the decision-maker as a potential factor that leads to making
impatient choices in pathological gamblers as compared to normal
controls. Scholars usually conceptually separate the phenotype of a
disorder (the phenomenological level) from the endophenotype
(the functions that underlie the disorder) [4]. To study the first
level, self-report measures are used, whereas indicators of the
second level are behavioral (e.g. reaction times) and physiological
indexes (e.g. electroencephalography), indexes that are able to
detect hidden features behind the appearance of the disorder.
Though correlated, scholars showed different predictive values of
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these two kinds of measures [50]. In the present study we used self-
administered impulsivity questionnaires (BIS11 and PG-Y-BOCS)
as phenotypical measures of impulsivity, and intertemporal
decision task, as an endophenotypical measure [4]. We predict
differences at both levels in the two populations. We predict
gamblers will show a higher percentage of smaller sooner choices,
faster responses (in the neurocognitive task), and higher impulsivity
traits. In other words, we aim to show a clear relationship between
impulsivity and choices (in the self-report measures). We also
expect that time (in the form of longer delays) bias pathological
gamblers decisions towards the more impatient choice and that
they overall discount values more faster than controls. Finally, we
Figure 1. Experimental procedure and self-report measures. (A) A timeline of the experiment is presented. See text for further information.
(B) Results from the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS), measuring impulsivity traits are displayed. Gamblers scored higher level of impulsivity as compared
with controls, over two subscales (Motor impulsiveness and non- planning impulsiveness). (C) PG-Y-BOCS scale also showed larger differences across
the two populations, with gamblers scoring much higher on both subscales and on the total score scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109197.g001
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expect a relationship between phenotypical and endophenotypical
measures of impulsivity.
Methods
The ethical review board of the University of Trento approved
the study and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
2.1 Participants
Twenty-three adults (20 males, 3 females; mean age = 37.47,
SD=9.36; education = 12.65, SD=1.92) diagnosed with patho-
logic gambling in line with DSM IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) and ICD 10 (World Health Organization,
1994) criteria, and twenty-three controls (20 males, 3 females;
mean age = 35.61, SD=9.00; education = 12.09, SD=2.96) with-
out physical, psychiatric or neurological problems were recruited
in the present study. Patients were recruited from a clinical centre
devoted to the treatment of addictions known as S.I.I.Pa.C
(Societa` Italiana di Intervento Patologie Compulsive) in Bolzano,
Italy. Importantly, patients with substance abuse and other
comorbid disorders (such as anxiety disorders), or cognitive
impairment, were excluded from the study.
2.2 Experimental Procedures
a) Assessment. Gambling severity was assessed for both
populations by the South Okas Gambling Screen questionnaire
(SOGS [51]). In addition, participants also filled out a series of self-
administered questionnaires in the assessment phase (before the
experimental phase in order to avoid any carryover effect). These
comprised the Positive and Negative Affective scales (PANAS, trait
version; [52]) to test for the level of negative affect; the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI 1 and 2, [53]), to test for anxiety traits.
Notably, these gamblers suffered mainly from common non-
strategic gambling (slots, video poker, cards).
b) Self report measures of impulsivity. The Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; [54]) was administered to test for
participants’ trait level of general impulsivity, as well as the
Pathological Gambling Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale
(PG Y-BOCS; [55]), to assess participants’ impulsivity and
compulsivity in gambling. These two scales can differentiate the
participants on impulsivity traits, and can be used to test our
hypothesis regarding a link between impulsivity and impatient
choices.
c) Performance measure of reward sensitivity/
processing. Participants were first instructed as to the nature
of the task (see Figure 1A for details). They were told the study
aimed to assess how people make decisions about different
monetary rewards, which can be obtained after a shorter or
longer waiting time. They were told that every trial consisted of
one option with a relatively small monetary reward obtainable
after a short delay, and a larger monetary reward obtainable after
a longer delay.
The computerized task consisted of 194 trials, divided into 4
sessions of 48 choices. Within each block the following variables
were manipulated: Waiting time for shorter sooner (SS) options:
today, 1 month, 6 months, 12 months and 18 months; Waiting
time for longer later (LL) options: today, 1 month, 6 months, 12
months, 18 months and 24 months; Reward values for SS options:
5 J, 10 J, 20 J, 30 J, 40 J, 50 J, 60 J, 70 J, 80 J, 90 J, 95 J,
100 J; Reward value for LL options: 100 J. Inside each block,
every amount from 5 J to 95 J was repeated four times (two
times per left and right side). The 100 J offer was repeated 26
times per side. Moreover, every time delay was repeated 8 times
per side. In total, there were 96 offers paired in 48 choices for
every block. Importantly both groups were administered with the
same type and number of offers. The four blocks were
counterbalanced and had the same amount of time and money.
Participants were instructed as to how to select the preferred
option by pressing one of two buttons within a time limit of
10 seconds. After the choice, a feedback signal for the selected
option appeared. Importantly, participants were informed they
would be paid with real money, based on a choice randomly
selected at the conclusion of the experiment. Pairs of stimuli were
displayed randomly, with each combination repeated 4 times and
counterbalanced across the left-right side of the screen (see
Figure 1A).
Before running the experiment subjects performed a training




First of all, no significant differences between the groups in
terms of age (p= .51) and education (p= .58) were visible (see
Table 1). As expected, patients and controls differed significantly
in terms of gambling severity (SOGS, PG scored: 12.30, CTRL
scored: 0.13, t(44) = 17.55, p,.001); but not in anxiety STAI1
(t(44) = 1.58; p= .121) and STAI2 (t(44) = 0.76; p= .449), exclud-
ing the possibility of comorbid pathologies (Giddens et al., 2012).
The Positive and Negative Affective scales (PANAS, trait version)
demonstrated a significant difference in the ‘‘Negative Affect’’
scale (gamblers: 20.70, controls: 14.91 t(44) = 3.72, p,.001), but
not in ‘‘Positive Affect’’ (p..05).
3.2 Self report measures of impulsivity
Importantly for the present study, the two groups differed in the
BIS ‘‘motor impulsiveness’’ subscale (PG: 22.70, CTRL: 17.57,
t(44) = 4.17, p,.0001), measuring a relative lack of control in
motor behavior, and in the BIS ‘‘non-planning impulsiveness’’
subscale (PG: 29.04, CTRL: 23.56, t(44) = 5.29, p,.0001),
indicating a deficit in planning their behavior, but not in the
BIS ‘‘attentional impulsiveness scale’’ (t(44) =21.623; p= .112).
Moreover, the groups differed in terms of impulsivity and
compulsivity at gambling in the PG-Y-BOCS (obsession subscale:
PG: 8.48, CTRL: 0.30, t(44) = 9.01, p,.0001, and in compulsive-
ness subscale PG: 7.83, CTRL: 0.35, t(44) = 7.61, p,.0001). See
Table 1 and Figure 1. These results confirm that PG have higher
impulsivity in self-reported measures (phenotypical level).
3.3 Performance measure of reward sensitivity/
processing
a) Choices. To examine differences in choices between
patients and controls, we compared the number of chosen SS
options between the two groups. This showed a significant
difference: t(44) = 3.811, p,.0001. PG selected 67,73% of SS,
whereas CTRL only 54,13% (see Figure 2A), clearly showing a
difference in choices as PG displayed a strong bias toward smaller,
sooner options.
Then, we computed a mixed ANOVA on reaction times (RTs)
as the dependent variable and groups as a between factor. RTs
were calculated separately for SS and LL options and for every
subject of both groups. This yielded a main effect of reaction time
(F(1, 43) = 10.118, p,.01, as well as an interaction with group
(F(1, 43) = 4.029, p,.05). Independent sample t-tests, corrected for
multiple comparisons, confirmed that patients were significantly
faster than controls when selecting SS options (t(44) = 3.594, p,
How Impulsivity Affects Temporal Decisions in Pathological Gamblers
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Table 1. Demographic and clinical assessment.
Pathological gamblers Normal controls Sig.
a) Demographic data
Age 35.61 (9.00) 37.48 (9.94) p = 0.51
Education 12.13 (2.69) 12.65 (1.92) p = 0.48
Sex 20 M, 3 M 20 M, 3 F /
Ethnicity All caucasian All caucasian /
Handedness 21 right, 2 left 20 right, 3 left /
b) Diagnostic data
Diagnosis (DSM IV) 23 PG Without history of neurological and psychiatric diagnosis /
SOGS 12.30 (3.27) 0.13 (0.63) p,.0001
PANAS - positive affect 29.39 (6.48) 31.52 (7.30) p = .30
PANAS - negative affect 20.70 (6.70) 14.91 (3.29) p,.0001
STAI 1 38.48 (5.70) 41.22 (5.11) p = .12
STAI 2 35.48 (7.83) 37.17 (7.22) p = .45
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109197.t001
Figure 2. Performance results. (A) The percentage of smaller sooner choices statistically differed across the two populations, with gamblers
showing higher percentage of SS. (B) Reaction times analyses showed interesting differences between the two populations with gamblers being
faster in selecting SS choices only. Bars indicate stanmdard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109197.g002
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.001), further showing that these smaller, sooner options were
selected with greater impulsivity. However, the same difference
was not evident when considering LL options (t(43) = 1.522,
p= .135). Within the PG group, the comparison between reaction
times when considering the SS and LL options revealed a
significant difference (t(21) =24.896, p,.0001. This result did not
extend to controls (t(22) = 0.702, p= .49). Note that one subject
within the pathological gamblers group was excluded because they
selected only SS options. See Figure 2B. This result further
confirms that PG are characterized by impatience (faster choices)
toward smaller, sooner rewards.
Next, we calculated two indices that allowed us to better
understand how both the amount of reward and the delay time
influenced decisions across both groups. One possibility is that
gamblers differ from controls for the way they weight the amount
of reward or the amount of waiting time to obtain a reward.
Therefore, we calculated the difference between every combina-
tion of LL and SS presented during the task (‘‘DReward’’); then,
we separated the percentage of SS choices according to three
different DReward values, grouped in the following way: LL –
SS= 20 J or less (small D), from 30 J to 60 J (medium D), 70 J
or above (large D). A mixed Analysis of Variance was fit to the data
using number of SS choices as the dependent variable, ‘‘DRe-
ward’’ (D#20, 30,D,60, D$70) as a within-subject factor, and
groups (PG vs. CTRL) as a between-subject factor. The factor
DReward was found to be significant (F(2, 88) = 194.85, p,.0001),
as well as the interaction with groups (F(2, 88) = 13.91, p,.0001).
More specifically, multiple comparisons corrected t-tests showed
that patients chose significantly more SS options with medium
(t(44) = 3.28, p,.005) or high (t(44) = 5.27, p,.0001) DReward
values. However, they did not differ for small DReward quantities
(p..008). See Figure 3A. This result confirms that when the
amount of reward increases (medium to large) PG are biased
toward impatient choices (SS options).
The second calculation involved the factor waiting time,
calculated as the difference between waiting time associated with
LL and SS options (DTime). We split the number of SS choices
into the five intervals of delay used in the experimental task: 1, 6,
12, 18 and 24 months of difference between the SS and LL
alternatives. A Mixed Analysis of Variance (mixed ANOVA) was
fit to the data using the percentage of SS choices as the dependent
variable, DTime (D=1, D=6, D=12, D=18, D=24) as a within-
subject factor, and groups (gamblers vs. controls) as a between-
subject factor. Both DTime (F(4, 176) = 34.73, p,.0001), and
interaction with groups (F(4, 176) = 4.361, p,.005) were found
significant. Independent sample t-tests corrected for multiple
comparisons, showed that the two populations differ when D=1,
D=6, D=24 (p,.005), but not for D=12, D=18 (p..005). See
Figure 3B. In other words, waiting time and amount of reward
weight the decisional process of the two populations in different
ways. Overall, gamblers prefer SS options, however, they still
prefer impatient choices even when the amount of reward
increases, whereas controls shift toward a more patient choice
(LL options) to increase their gain. The second result is that the
two populations differ in terms of choices when the waiting time is
very small or very large, with gamblers selecting more SS options
as compared with controls.
b) Regression analyses. To test the hypothesis that impul-
sivity, reward amount and delay time all influence participants’
decisions, regression analyses were computed. To begin with, we
computed a logistic regression using the three BIS subscales as a
measure of general impulsiveness and the two subscales of PG-Y-
BOCS (Y-BOCS1 and Y-BOCS2) as measures of impulsivity and
gambling compulsiveness the reward amount of the SS option
(qSS), the delay time of the SS option (tSS), and Group. The
dependent variable was the choice of the SS option (1 = yes,
0 = no). On all the data and findings reported hereafter power
analyses were undertaken showing an effect size of 0.6 (medium to
large), and a statistical power of 0.9. Results showed that Group
was a significant factor ( =22908.508, p,.001); the three BIS
scales (attention scale, BIS1; motor impulsiveness, BIS2; and non-
planning impulsiveness, BIS3) were significant factors in explain-
ing choice (respectively, = 8.040, p,.001; = 7.111, p,.001;
= 5.777, p,.001). The same was found for the two scales of PG-
Y-BOCS (respectively =2247.566, p,.001; and = 309.408,
p,.001). Both the amount and delay of the of SS were also
significant (respectively, = 0.346, p,.001; = 0.844, p,.05).
Notably these factors significantly interacted with the factor Group
(Group*BIS1: = 246.501, p,.001; Group*BIS2: =249.397,
p,.001; Group*BIS3: = 106.535 p,.001; Group*Y-BOCS1:
= 292.830, p,.001; Group*Y-BOCS2: =246.185, p,.001;
Group*qSS: = 0.561, p,.001; but not Group*tSS: = 0.259,
p= .655). These results overall confirm a strict relation between
impulsivity (as detected by self-report measures) and choices, but
also between delay time and amount of reward and choices.
c) Delay discounting function. To examine how subjects
discounted rewards according to waiting time, we calculated the
discount factor. This refers to the decrease in the subjective value
of a reward as a function of the delay between the time when an
option is chosen and the time when the reward becomes available.
The behavior of subjective value over time is well-described
through the ‘‘hyperbolic model’’ proposed by Grossbard and
Mazur [28,56]. The discount rate can be described with a family
of hyperbolic functions following the above equation:
SV~R= 1z k Wð Þ½ ð Þ
where ‘‘SV’’ summarizes the subjective value of delayed reward.
‘‘R’’ is the value of the reward available after waiting, ‘‘W’’ the
waiting time associated with the reward (‘‘R’’), and ‘‘k’’ is the
discount rate parameter. It provides the effect of reduction on
reward (‘‘R’’) per 1-unit increase in waiting time (‘‘W’’). So, to
compute how much someone devalues a quantity over time, the
‘‘k’’ parameter of the hyperbolic function must be derived. This
parameter can be calculated by comparing a ‘‘SS’’ options with a
‘‘LL’’, when the ‘‘SS’’ is chosen, with the following formula:
k~(RLL{RSS)=½(RSS{WLL){(RSS WSS)
where ‘‘RLL’’ is the reward linked to ‘‘LL’’ option, ‘‘RSS’’ is the
reward linked to ‘‘SS’’ option, ‘‘WLL’’ is the waiting time
associated to ‘‘LL’’ option and ‘‘WSS’’ is the waiting time of ‘‘SS’’
option. The k value was computed per subject as a mean of the k
values calculated for every option that subject selected.
We found a greater tendency to devalue monetary rewards over
time for the PG (k= 0.33) as compared to controls (k = 0.05),
t(44) = 5.53, p,.0001. See Figure 4A. Then, we plotted the
hyperbolic function for the two groups according to their k values
for a hypothetical reward of 100 J (See Figure 4B). The steepness
of the devaluation curve is greater in PG (in blue) than CTRL (in
red). We also calculated the area behind the two curves for each
participants. T-test revealed a significant difference between
controls (area = 732.75) and gamblers (area = 353.86)
(t(44) = 8.071, p,.001).
Additionally, we estimated the ‘‘indifference point’’, i.e. the
point when people choose equally (50%) an SS or an LL option.
How Impulsivity Affects Temporal Decisions in Pathological Gamblers
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These points were calculated through comparing the subjective
values for the SS and LL alternatives, according to the following
equation:
RSS=½1z(k WSS)~RLL=½1z(k WLL)
For pathological gamblers, 3.03 months are needed to devalue
100 J to 50 J:
50=½1z(0:33  0)~100=½1z(0:33 WLL)
50~100=½1z(0:33 WLL)
WLL~(100{50)=(50  0:33)~3:03
Whereas for controls, 20 months are required to reach the same
devaluation:




The current study examined how impulsivity may affect
decision-making in pathological gamblers as compared to normal
Figure 3. Further performance results. (A) Sooner Small choices are presented separated according to increasing difference in the magnitude of
rewards of the two options. Significant differences are displayed between gamblers and controls in the medium and large range. (B) Sooner Small
choices are shown for the five months interval., The two groups differed in percentage of SS in all time intervals. Bars indicate stanmdard error of the
mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109197.g003
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controls. Two types of measures were considered: endophenoty-
pical performance measure of reward sensitivity/processing
(intertemporal choice task) and phenotypical self-report measures
(impulsivity related questionnaires).
At an endophenotypical level, we found that pathological
gamblers selected a greater number of smaller sooner choices as
compared with age, gender, and education matched non-
gamblers. Indeed, when asked to make choices between a smaller
sooner option and a larger later one, gamblers were systematically
biased toward smaller but more quickly obtainable gains, whereas
controls showed no clear preference between the two options (half
of the times they selected SS options). Notably, this experiment
provides further and more clear evidence that gamblers deviate
from controls when making decisions. Previous studies using for
example the Iowa Gambling Task failed to find any difference in
decision-making when comparing gamblers with healthy controls
[57]. Moreover, in our study gamblers were quicker (faster RTs)
when selecting the SS option relative to controls, another measure
of impatience.
To understand how reward amount and delay time biased
participants’ choices, we computed the ratio of SS choices for
three intervals of reward magnitude. We found that for both
groups when the difference in terms of reward between the options
was small (less than 20 euros) they behaved in the same way, that
is, selecting with almost 90% the smaller, sooner options.
However, when the difference in magnitude increases (medium
values), while controls still show no preference between SS and LL
(indifference point, 50%), gamblers are biased toward the SS
option. Finally, for the higher difference in reward, controls rarely
selected the SS (less than 20% of times), while gamblers are still at
the indifference point (50%). The same analyses applied to delay
revealed that both smaller and larger differences in delays led
gamblers to select more SS options as compared with controls. In
other words, when the difference in time was small PG selected the
sooner available reward, while at the same time when the time to
wait was long, they again preferred the smaller, sooner option.
Moreover, both groups were tested for personality traits of
impulsivity using the Barratt Impulsivity Scale. At a phenotypical
level, the two groups differ in two subscales (motor impulsivity and
non-planning impulsiveness), with gamblers scoring much higher
values of impulsivity. Another measure of impulsivity and
compulsivity more related with gambling behavior used in the
present study was the PG-Y-BOCS. Once again, gamblers scored
much higher in both subscales. To test for any relation between
Figure 4. Discount factor and hyperbolic function. (A) Discount factor k is displayed for both groups. Gamblers displayed a larger value about
six times larger than controls. (B) Fitted hyperbolic functions are displayed for both groups. Gamblers showed steeper discount function rather than
controls. It takes 20 months for controls to discount 100 euros to its half, whereas gamblers show the same result after 3 months.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109197.g004
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impulsivity and the quantity of reward and waiting time of the
option to be selected, we then computed a regression analyses with
factors such as the subscales of BIS, PG-Y-BOCS, the quantity of
reward and waiting time of the SS options. This analysis showed a
clear and strong relation between impulsivity and choices, but also
an effect of reward and time. Importantly, when splitting for the
two groups, impulsivity affected both gamblers and controls
choices, however, it had a stronger effect on gamblers choices
rather than control. In other words, impulsivity affects our
intertemporal decisions in normal and abnormal conditions.
However, when impulsivity is very high it biases our decisions
toward more impatient choices rather when it is lower. We argue
that impulsivity may be considered as one of the factors leading
subjects to the decision to select the soon available reward.
Bechara [58] suggested a model to explain such ‘‘myopia of the
future’’ as a product of an imbalance of two separate but
interacting systems that control decision making: an impulsive,
intuitive based on the amygdala and other relevant emotional
structures (such as striatum) for signaling pain and pleasure of
immediate prospects, and a reflective based on the prefrontal
cortex for signaling for pain or pleasure for future prospects. In
optimal cases, the reflective system has to monitor and eventually
inhibit the impulsive system. However, in some cases this does not
happen and the impulsive system can override the reflective
system. Importantly, the author predicts that the striatum,
responding to concrete or abstract monetary rewards, can be
one of the forces that may bypass the intervention of the reflective
cortical system. Consistent with this hypothesis, the striatum is one
of the key regions that seems involved in intertemporal decisions.
Neuroimaging studies on normal subjects showed increased striatal
activity associated with smaller, sooner choices in the inter-
temporal task [59,60]. It should be noted, that fMRI studies on
gamblers reported increased activity of the striatum when subjects
were presented with gambling cues and monetary gains as
compared with controls [61]. Another observation comes from
the fact that a double relationship between dopamine (generated
by the striatum cells) and impulsivity, and between dopamine and
gambling behavior seems to exist. Dopamine is implicated in
rewarding and reinforcing behaviors and drug addiction [62].
Indeed, some studies have reported increased cerebrospinal fluid
of dopamine and its metabolites in PG [63,64]. Interestingly,
increased dopamine induced by pharmacological administration,
led normal subjects to discount more as compared with a placebo
condition [60]. Future studies may test for this complex
relationship between dopamine, striatum activity and impatient
choices as shown by high impulsivity individuals.
Moreover, gamblers discounted in a steeper way as compared
with controls, meaning that they devalue monetary rewards over
time more rapidly. Notably, we found a similar discount rate for
controls as a previous study from Petry [43] and Brevers and
colleagues [45] did, even though it is hard to make direct
comparisons for obvious differences in the methodology. However,
this population has the confound of substance abuse. Unfortu-
nately, Brevers and colleagues [45], did not report k values.
We believe this paper has several implications for the
understanding of gambling addiction. Pathological gambling as
other addiction disorders are characterized by a lack of self-
regulation [20,65]. Indeed, this condition has been defined as an
impulse control disorder by DSM IV-TR [66] and as a behavioral
addiction [67,68] in DSM V [69]. Indeed, previous studies found
diminished neurocognitive self-regulatory functions in PG [4], and
neurological alterations in reward circuitry [18,19]. Neurobiolog-
ical studies showed that diminished dopamine receptor availability
(due to addiction behaviors) may cause a chronic reward
deficiency in the brain, resulting in a vulnerability to engage in
reward seeking behaviors [20]. Indeed, a cardinal feature of
gamblers and other addiction behaviors seems to be a tendency to
act upon acute impulses, or in other words, they show high traits of
impulsivity [70,71]. However, in the clinical and experimental
literature there was not a direct proof of the link between
impulsivity and actual decisions inside the population of gamblers.
By this experiment we were able to show not only that gamblers do
suffer from high impulsivity, but more importantly, that such
impulsivity affects how they decide upon an immediate available
options (leading to impatient choices). This behavior can explain
why these individuals engage in available bets without the
possibility to inhibit nor postpone them. Indeed, recent experi-
mental observations led scientists to consider disinhibition as a
predominant executive deficit present in PG. For example, one
study from Potenza et al, [18] showed that in a Stroop task,
gamblers compared to controls, were showing less activation in
inhibition areas such as the left middle and superior frontal gyri. A
recent review examined several performance measures of reward
sensitivity/processing of inhibitory processes such as filtering of
irrelevant information and inhibiting prepotent responses that are
impaired in gamblers [61]. These neurocognitive impairments
seem coherent with a lack of impulse control or high impulsivity
when presented with real or hypothetical rewards.
In more cognitive terms, a distinction between two kinds of
thinking, often termed reflective and intuitive, has been proposed
by some researchers to account for such phenomena [72,27].
Intuitive thinking is typically described as quick, emotion-based
and with no conscious effort required; reflective thinking is slow,
norm-based and conscious. Authors have suggested that these two
ways of thinking can be seen as different types of processes (Type 1
and 2). Evans [72], conceptualized the conflict between these two
styles of thinking as a ‘‘cognitive control problem’’, referring to the
fundamental question of the mechanism by which control over the
answer is ultimately allocated, and suggested how this conflict
could be resolved. He points out that when confronted with a
decision, Type 1 processing automatically produces default
intuitive responses, unless the slower and more reflective Type 2
processing intervenes (see also [27]). This view is coherent with the
neurobiological view of a diminished neurocognitive self-regula-
tory functions in PG [4,73].
Beside the novelty of the study, some limitations must be
acknowledged. Even though the control group was matched to PG
group for relevant dimensions, we must acknowledge the fact that
other demographical and social status factors were not taken into
account. Future studies may want to control also for these factors.
Another limitation relies in the fact that the intertemporal choice
paradigm we used was quite different from the ones used by other
authors in the past, thus limiting a direct comparison between
results. At a more conceptual level, the definition of impulsivity
seems strongly correlated with the concept of lack of inhibition.
Indeed, one definition of impulsivity is the lack of inhibition.
However in the present study the link between lack of inhibition
and decisions has not been tested. Future studies may want to
address this topic by using response inhibition tasks such as the
stop-signal paradigm [74] to test the hypothesis that gamblers have
deficits in this domain and that these deficits are related with
impulsive decisions. Notably, response inhibition is connected with
the fronto-basal-ganglia circuit that has been shown to have
implications for addiction problems. Last but not least, we
acknowledged the fact that PG were tested inside the clinic in
which they were admitted for treatment and not in their natural
gambling context (see [49] for the effect of context on gambling
behavior). This may have biased the results. In conclusion we
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believe that this study sheds some light on the link between
impulsivity and impatient decisions the population of pathological
gamblers. Moreover, we believe this study can add understanding
on the etiology of behavioral addictions and impulse control
disorders, and may offer some indications for clinical interventions
on this relevant and nowadays widespread pathology. One
consequence of these results is that if clinicians want impulsive
choices to be reduced, impulsivity must be contained and
regulated. Moreover, knowing that gamblers suffer from strong
biases in their decision-making and in the temporal perception of
rewards, can greatly help clinicians to incorporate methods and
techniques to balance decision based biases in their clinical work.
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